МОВОЗНАВСТВО

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CZECHOSLOVAK NORMALISATION VS. CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL MEDIA: IDENTIFYING THE IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE MARKERS

B a c k g r o u n d *. Czechoslovakia belonged among the countries that fell into the sphere of the Soviet influence in the wake of WW2. In the Eastern Bloc, all aspects of public life were controlled by state institutions, including literature and publishing. This paper consists of two parts. Firstly, it presents research dealing with the literary paratexts pertaining to fiction translated from English into Slovak and published during the normalisation period. The goal was to explore the ideological discourse in the selected material and identify Soviet propaganda. Secondly, it explains how the same methodology can be used to identify contemporary Russian propaganda on the Internet.*

M e t h o d s *. This paper combines translation historiography and material research. In the first part, discourse analysis was performed on 100 samples of paratexts. The method of analysing ideological discourse markers is subsequently transposed to a new context, i.e., contemporary propaganda on the Slovak social media with the purpose to illustrate how current Russian propaganda affects not only the virtual environment, but also physical reality in Slovakia.*

R e s u l t s *. The presence of ideological markers in the normalisation paratexts peaked in 1977, which correlates with Charter 77, an informal civic initiative against normalisation practices. The results of the second part of the presented research show that contemporary Russia successfully uses the same persuasion techniques as during the existence of the Soviet Union. The content found in the samples can be easily traced back to the "alternative" media outlets, some of them demonstrably funded by Russia. However, in the online era, dissemination of false information and propaganda is much faster, which poses a global security risk for democracy and human rights.*

C o n c l u s i o n s *. As the Globsec survey (Szekers 2021) has shown, Slovakia is the most vulnerable EU country when it comes to falling for disinformation. The presented method of ideological discourse marker analysis could be helpful in terms of propaganda identification. The Internet requires a completely new skillset to sift through the vast amount of information that may or may not be credible.*

K e y w o r d s : *translation historiography; normalisation; paratext; social media; ideology; propaganda.*

Background

Historical context. After the Second World War, Czechoslovakia landed in the Soviet sphere of influence. The Communist Party supported by Moscow (as historians refer to the Headquarters of the Soviet Communist Party) organised a successful coup d'état in 1948. The 1950s were marked by forced collectivisation and nationalisation of private property, kangaroo trials, and executions of Communist officials aimed to intimidate any ideological opponents. In the 1960s, Nikita Kruschev's Thaw partially lifted the restrictions imposed by the Communist rule, which gave rise to a movement focused on democratisation in Czechoslovakia led by Alexander Dubček. It culminated in the Prague Spring of 1968. However, as soon as on 21 August 1968, the Soviet army and its Warsaw Treaty Allies invaded Czechoslovakia, and the 40-year Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia started. The period known as normalisation ensued and lasted until 1989. During this period, the Soviet power aimed to put everything "back in line" and remove any disruptive (read democratic) elements (Kořínek, 1968; Moulis, 2006; Hruboň et al., 2012).

Methods

This paper combines translation historiography and material research. In the first part, discourse analysis was performed on 100 samples of paratexts. The method of analysing ideological discourse markers is subsequently transposed to a new context, i.e., contemporary propaganda on the Slovak social media with the purpose to illustrate how current Russian propaganda affects not only the virtual environment, but also physical reality in Slovakia.

Normalisation practices. As Igor Tyšš puts it, "There is always something two-sided, or even bipolar, about the Czechoslovak socialist period, its history, its art, ideology, and propaganda. It was, above all, extensively – if not compulsively – bureaucratic, centralised, and ostentatiously public. Yet, the discourse of the era, as we will see, displays strong incongruences between what was formally expected and what was, if needed, done informally" (Tyšš, 2017a, p. 74).

Tomáš Glanc has researched normalisation of Russian studies at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague. On 2 June 1970, all departments received an order from the Ministry of Education to perform "a complex (study-political) assessment of teaching graduates" (Glanc, 2020, p. 106) in terms of their participation in political organisation and events, knowledge of Marxist methodology, self-assessment of their personal political development, and their opinion of the new political situation. Based on his familiarity with the samizdat, tamizdat, and unofficial educational activities at the Evening School of Bohemistics, Glanc has explained: "I considered the educational contents selective, ideologised, and in many cases, raped in terms of interpretation" (Glanc, 2020, p. 107). Students' freedom of choice regarding the courses was reduced and strategies aimed at intensifying the control were implemented.

All publishing houses at the time were state owned and strictly controlled. Magová and Passia (Magová, & Passia, 2015), and Rubáš (Rubáš et al., 2012) collected testimonies from Slovak and Czech literary translators active at the time. During the period of normalisation, ideological committees repeatedly interviewed them to obtain clearance and continue working for publishing houses. Background checks were performed as well and if the translator's compliance with the ideology was compromised, they were banned from working in the field. This applied to jobs in culture and education in general, which is why many experts ended up doing manual labour at the time.

Although some of the translators who provided the testimonies were effectively forced out of their job, no official blacklists have been found among the period documents. Either way, the translator community found a workaround right away – they created a system of fake names and borrowed identities, which allowed their banned colleagues to continue working in secret. Czech scholar Zdeňka Rachůnková's research (Rachůnková, 1992) showed that this practice was extremely widespread – she managed to link almost 600 true translators to the books translated under fake names between 1949 and 1989. However, Glanc (Glanc, 2020) has explained that one's membership in the Communist Party could have a variety of consequences – from persecuting less politically conscious colleagues to occasional support of otherwise ideologically problematic persons or topics. He has also emphasized that normalisation in Russian studies was performed from the inside – the employees "surely responded to social pressure and ideological demand" (Glanc, 2020, p. 114). Glanc provides an example from the university environment: literary scholar Eva Fojtíková bullied her colleague Světla Mathauserová's daughter (a graduate of English and Russian languages). In her cadre evaluation card, Fojtíková stated that due to the girl's inappropriate family environment and temperament, she should not be accepted to the Communist Party (presumably with the aim to limit her career opportunities). However, Fojtíková's behaviour documented in the period department records was probably not driven by opportunism – she seems to have honestly believed that the 1960s development would lead to disintegration of socialist science and culture (Jareš, Spurný, & Volná, 2012).

Results

Ideology and ideological markers. Stråth (Stråth, 2013) has explained that the term "ideology" first appeared during the French Revolution and originally referred to "a new science of ideas", but was soon politicised. In the 20th century, during which multiple totalitarian ideologies occurred, "ideologies were conceptualized as long, coherent chains of thought that served as instruments for managing societies and negotiating social and political power" (Zmigrod, 2022). Today, ideology is perceived as an integrated cultural phenomenon, which takes the form of a worldview, recurring interpretation frameworks, and thinking patterns (Verschueren, 2012). Although ideology per se is a neutral concept, specific types of ideology (e.g. political or religious) can be exploited for the purpose of manipulation. As history has repeatedly shown, ideology may lead to human rights violation, genocides, and wars. Allport's Scale of Prejudice (Allport, 1949) reflects how manipulative ideological discourse can lead from (1) hate-speech through (2) avoidance, (3) discrimination, (4) physical attack, to (5) extermination.

Verschueren (Verschueren, 2012) further explains that in terms of ideological discourse, prescriptiveness takes the form of normativity, which appeals to common sense. However, it is community based rather than individual and refers to history. Thus, interpretation frameworks are created. Although public social and power relationships play the key role in their shaping, "powerless" social groups can and do have their own ideologies as well. The difference between ideology and conviction is that while ideology has a fundamental axiomatic basis limiting individual opinions, conviction is more individual (Van Dijk, 2006). A member of an ideological community is expected to accept the content as given, i.e., to share this content with the community. This mechanism is intersubjective and

works as a paradigm. Ideology is rarely removed from social reality – it helps constitute it. Although individuals perceive ideology as something that is not to be challenged, it is dynamically developing under changing circumstances, which requires the community to adjust its way of thinking (Verschueren, 2012).

Research methodology. The concept of "ideological discourse marker" used throughout this paper is not related to discourse markers (e.g. anyway, however, moreover). It refers to markers, which characterise an ideological discourse. An ideological marker is a feature or characteristic that signals membership in a particular ideology or belief system (Van Dijk, 2006). These markers can take many forms, such as vocabulary, symbols, rituals, and other linguistic features (Zmigrod, 2022).

The research presented in this paper consists of two parts. The first part is focused on paratexts, specifically Slovak forewords and afterwords supplied by the Slovak publishing houses to accompany the novels translated from English into Slovak published between 1968 and 1989, i.e., during the period of normalisation. In accordance with Tyšš's typology of approaches to translation history research (Tyšš, 2017b), it takes the form of a case study.

The partial goals were specified as follows:

(1) to collect all existing and available forewords and afterwords with the selected parameters (i – fiction translated from English into Slovak, ii – published in Slovakia between 1968 and 1989, iii – foreword/afterword added to the Slovak translation), qualify and quantify their ideological charge;

(2) to identify the topics characteristically addressed by the forewords;

(3) to determine whether the results of material research support the historical image depicted by the available microhistorical research, i.e., testimonials.

The bibliographic research identified 555 novels published during the selected period. Upon manual sorting, exactly 100 forewords and afterwords were found.

Based on Verschueren (Verschueren, 2012) and Van Dijk (Van Dijk, 2006), I created an analytical table allowing for qualitative as well as quantitative analysis of ideologically charged elements in a text. The presence of the ideological discourse markers was identified, evaluated, and interpreted. For the purpose of this paper, I will present a quantitative overview of the results and discuss their implications[1].

The second part of material research presented in this paper deals with examples of public Facebook posts manifesting one or more ideological discourse markers. For the purpose of this paper, I created a simplified version of the analytic tool, which I had used in my previous research (Bachledová, 2017, 2021) and summed it up into 9 points for easier orientation:

1) The speaker claims they belong to a particular group or accuses the addressee of belonging to a particular group.

2) We are presented positively/they are presented negatively.

3) Our negative attributes are withheld or downplayed/their negative attributes are pointed out.

4) The topics allowing to present us positively/them negatively are selected deliberately.

5) The opponent should or must do something.

6) We are right and they are wrong without providing arguments.

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[1] A detailed qualitative analysis can be found my previous publications *Ideológia v paratextoch k prekladovej literatúre 1968–1989* (2017) and Translators and Publishers in Czechoslovakia (1968–1989): Following and Subverting the Ideology In *Translation, Interpreting and Culture. Old Dogmas, New Approaches* (2021).

7) Provided arguments are based on stereotypes and/or inappropriate generalisation.

8) Logical fallacies occur.

9) Appeal to traditions and constructs.

The samples include 3 public Facebook posts and 1 comment published by Slovak commenters. All samples were deliberately selected in order to illustrate the ideological discourse markers. To complete the picture, I included a (serious) newspaper article addressing how the propaganda disseminated on social media has been transposed to physical reality. This part of research is qualitative in nature, therefore it does not provide information about quantitative parameters such as frequency or incidence. The samples will be translated in a way that tries to capture their stylistic and grammatical peculiarities as much as possible (e.g. missing punctuation or incorrect capitalisation).

Literary paratexts (1968–1989): research findings. The research identified the presence of ideological discourse markers in 69 out of 100 samples (69 %). Fig. 1 shows the distribution of samples over time while Fig. 2 shows the distribution of ideological charge over time.


Fig. 1. Distribution of samples over time

These findings support the image outlined in the theoretical part of this research, i.e., most of the forewords and afterwords from the selected period were ideologically marked. As can be seen, the ideological charge score peaked in 1977, although only 4 samples were published in that year. The biggest number of samples were published in 1987 (9), 1982 (8) and 1971 (8). This finding can relate to the fact that in 1977, Charter 77 – a civic initiative criticising the fact that human rights and religious freedom were being violated in Czechoslovakia – emerged. The Charter itself was signed by almost 1,900 (mostly Czech) dissidents including the future president, Václav Havel. In response, other well-known public figures (including the famous singers Karel Gott and Waldemar Matuška) were persuaded to sign a counter-document, which condemned Charter 77 and its signatories, the so-called Anti-Charter. Charter 77 signatories were subsequently persecuted by the State Security under the project code-named *Akcia Asanácia* [Action Renewal] (Kačmárik, 2022; Kosatík, 2016; Navara, 2009).

During the investigated period, the state power ensured that Czechoslovakia was isolated from the world outside the socialist camp. Ideological discourse was deliberately used to construct a binary simulacrum whose inhabitants believed that American capitalists were trying to dismantle their Socialist paradise. Propaganda, as a powerful manipulation tool, has been effectively exploited by totalitarian regimes throughout the history. Prando and Šuša (Prando, & Šuša, 2011) explain that the goal of propaganda is to convince the addressee – through suggestion and emotional coercion – whether the message is true/rational or not.


Fig. 2. Distribution of ideological charge over time

Sadly, as it was during the Soviet times, the propaganda exploiting ideological discourse remains an instrument widely used by the contemporary Russian government to influence the public opinion in other countries. The final part of this study explains why this issue should be paid attention and how the ideological markers can be identified, which is the first step necessary to protect ourselves from propaganda. For the purpose of illustration, I will use the us vs. them binary opposition to distinguish between pro-Russian social media commenters and all other communication participants.

Contemporary social media: research findings. According to GLOBSEC research (Szekers, 2021), the popularity of disinformation in Slovakia is alarming and it is the most vulnerable country in Europe in this respect (Mesežnikov, 2021). This development poses a serious threat not only to national security, but also to democracy as such. According to a recent nationwide survey (SITA, 2022), almost 60 % of Slovaks wish for a strict authoritarian. This development is influenced by several factors, but the major one is Russian propaganda consistently and deliberately influencing the Slovak social and alternative media.

I came across the first example in the Facebook comment section of an article titled "Ukrajina plánuje s Krymom VEĽKÉ veci: Demontujú most, vysťahujú Rusov a to nie je VŠETKO!" ("Ukrajine plans BIG things with Crimea: they are disassembling the bridge and will displace the Russians, and that is not ALL!") authored by Milan Hanzel and published by *DNES24.sk* (non-alternative news server) on 2 April 2023:


Fig. 3. "Sure, Russians are fleeing because some drugged Ukrainian dwarf is approaching"

This commenter ironically refers to a rumour that Ukrainian President Zelenskyi is a drug addict, which seems quite popular among the audience of alternative media. Moreover, it is also supposed to demean him by referring to his height. Points 2 (negative presentation),

3 (negative attributes pointed out), and 6 (no arguments) can be identified in this example.

An anonymous Facebook user (his name is made up) posted this publicly on 29 March 2023 in response to a short TikTok video posted on Instagram by Czech politician Tomio Okamura. The video shows an out-of-context cut-out of a speech given by Petr Kolář (main advisor of Czech President Petr Pavel) who literally says: "I completely disagree with my colleague Mr. Bašta that we should not supply Ukraine with weapons, I think we should supply Ukraine not only with weapons, but also with soldiers"[1].

**Fig. 4. "You pro-American bastard you should be hanged you fucker and sent to Zelenskyi as a gift"
Source: https://www.facebook.com/search/top?q=ty%
20zmrd%20proamericky%20povesit%20ta**

This is another example of a logical fallacy (point 8), since the commenter implies that supporting Ukrainian defence is a sign of pro-Americanism. By proxy, this could also be perceived as an appeal to a construct (point 8), i.e., anything that goes against Russia is automatically pro-American even if the US is not involved in reality. The Czech Republic shares borders with Ukraine and it is logical for them to support Ukrainian defence since Czechs could be the next in line if it failed (and they have already had this experience during the 30 years of Russian occupation as I have explained). It makes much more sense to see supporting Ukraine as a matter of national security rather than an attempt to appease the US.

**Fig. 5. "Dírer, you are a D*CK!"
Source: https://www.facebook.com/groups/602487993163910/
permalink/6032890476790274/**

"Dírer, you are a D*CK!
Who pays you, you pro-American louse?
The two of you – the pro-American clown and you you whore, I would load you into a MIG and let the pilot catapult above the Nazi Ukraine"

The public post by Miroslav Lisál of 19 February 2023 accompanies a screenshot from a TV programme (TA3) in which the Slovak Minister of Defence, Jaroslav Naď, explained why Slovakia decided to send MIG aircrafts to Ukraine. Richard Dírer, addressed by the expletive "DI*K" in this post, is a TV presenter. The post was published in a group named "Nenásilný občiansky odpor – AntiTerorista" ("Non-violent civic resistance – AntiTerrorist"). In this case, the speaker accuses the addressee of belonging to a particular group (point 1), presents them negatively (point 2), fails to provide any arguments (point 6), performs an inappropriate generalisation (point 7), and again, appeals

to the construct (point 9) that if someone supports Ukraine, they must be automatically pro-American.

Once again, the pro-Russian commenter presumably expects other people to be either pro-Russian or pro-American as if this stance existed in the form of a binary opposition instead of a scale. This strategy builds on the main Cold War propaganda "us vs. them" opposition, i.e., Russia vs. USA. In the recent years, it has been gaining popularity again, probably because navigation the current geopolitical situation is more difficult than ever. Binary oppositions provide us with a sense of control – even if they are factually incorrect. There is no evidence that either the minister or the TV host are pro-American or paid by a mysterious "someone" (presumably the US).

In fact, the Slovak Information Service (Breiner, 2023) have found out that several alternative media operating in Slovakia and spreading misinformation are funded by Russian diplomats and that the local fascist-descendant parties (CHO/Czech News Agency, 2017) are funded by a pro-Kremlin Belarusian entrepreneur. These media incited civil disobedience, e.g., public gatherings and violation of hygienic measures while hospitals were on the verge of collapse during the Covid pandemic. Detailed reports addressing these topics can be found at infosecurity.sk, the portal run by the Slovak Security Policy Institute (SSPI) and Stratpol – Strategic Policy Institute, which deals with online security.

**Fig. 6. "The whole world is against NATO"
Source: https://www.facebook.com/100041848663320/
videos/229884236088627/**

"The whole world is against NATO and the US and liberal fascism is trying to thwart it and inform as little as possible and Germany no longer wants to be a satellite state to the US and believe it or not Slovakia can be the one to start the war (our idiotic government) or the nation stands up and stops it,!!! Taken from Russian media."

On 18 March 2023, this commenter shared a post published by a well-known Russian propagandist news server *RIA Novosti* showing a 34-second video[2] of French-speaking protesters who supposedly wanted France to leave NATO and stop supplying Ukraine with weapons. However, the video has been cut in a way that does not show what the protest was about. The French protesters in the video are calling for the parliament for a vote of no confidence, but it is presented out of context. Neither NATO, nor Ukraine or any weapon supplies are mentioned in the video. I was unable to track down the original (uncut) video but upon a consultation with a French colleague, I concluded that with highest probability, this video was recorded during the series of French protests against the pension reform bill, which took place in January 2023. Obviously, the commenter did not understand the video and simply shared the post from RIA Novosti without paying attention to its factual content.

The comment itself is a compound of logical fallacies, for example, the claim that Germany no longer wants to be a satellite state […] is a false induction as there is no logical, causal link between this statement and the posted

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[1] Source: https://www.instagram.com/p/Cokox82omFu/?fbclid=IwAR1sj RiqJ7fl7y 7OZ1dt2yZd3bSxCQRvgF7YkNqDI3QLoICII7I9OYAamT0

[2] https://www.facebook.com/frantisek.sipos.7161/videos/229884236088627

video. It is difficult to even start analysing the claim that Germany is a satellite state of the US since it is a blatant lie rather than a logical fallacy. Germany has the largest national economy in Europe and ranks fourth worldwide (KPMG, 2023). Betts (Betts, 1945) defines satellite state as a country that is under heavy, political, or military influence of another country despite being formally independent. According to Bett's definition, Belarus can be seen as a Russian satellite state. One of the ideological discourse markers described by Van Dijk (2006) is that the speaker assigns their own moral deficiencies to their opponent, which creates inadvertent irony.

"Slovakia can be the one to start the war" is a slippery slope argument referring to another popular narrative – if we supply Ukraine with weapons to defend themselves from the Russian attacks, we risk that Russia will see us as an enemy by proxy. It can be inferred from the whole post that this commenter sees Russia as a friendly country and does not want to get on their bad side by contradicting its actions.

However, this post provides one more example of a fairly frequent ideological discourse marker, which I referred to as a buzz word in my previous research. Over the last years, pro-Russian commenters[1] on Slovak social media, including at least one member of the parliament (Dinič, 2022), have been frequently invoking the "liberal fascists" who are supposedly aiming to upend the world order and destroy the "traditional family".

Encyclopaedia Britannica defines liberalism as a "political doctrine that takes protecting and enhancing the freedom of the individual to be the central problem of politics". The *Oxford Languages* define liberal as "willing to respect or accept behaviour or opinions different from one's own; open to new ideas". On the other hand, fascism as a doctrine based on the palingenetic myth, which draws on the belief that a nation is sick, therefore it needs to be purified and "reborn" (Drábik, 2019). As can be seen, the phrase "liberal fascist" is an oxymoron. Russian propaganda has emptied the words "liberal" and "fascism" and turned them into a widely used term of abuse.

After Russia attacked Ukraine in February 2022, Slovak media became flooded with a new variant of this term of abuse – "Ukrainian Fascists" or the blended version, "Ukrofascists". Russian propaganda presents attacking Ukraine, shelling civil objects, raping, and murdering civilians as cleaning a country allegedly plagued by fascism. This is another example of how Russia projects its own moral deficiencies to the country it has victimised. The Slovak pro-Russian commenters massaged by the Russian propaganda through anti-system media have picked up this rhetoric. The simplicity and clarity of this content appeal to other social media users who usually do not even access the disinformation outlets directly due to the language barrier.

The lack of civic and political awareness among Slovak citizens can be illustrated by an event, which took place in Sliač in autumn 2022. The local citizens fell for a hoax that the US was going to build a military base in their town. The local government organised a local referendum in which they rejected the military base project, which does not exist in reality (TASR, 2023). Moreover, there already is a military aircraft base in Sliač – it was founded in the 1930s. Since 2022, Dutch and German soldiers have been manning the new Patriot defence system (Ministry of Defence of the SR 2023) provided by the allies after Slovakia donated its old S-300 missile system to Ukraine

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[1] Interestingly, this group seems to largely overlap with the supporters of the aforementioned Slovak fascist-descendant political parties.

(Katuška 2022). The rumour about a new military base has originated from misinformation, or rather disinformation about the *Defense Cooperation Agreement* between Slovakia and the US ratified in February 2022, which is a standard agreement among the members of NATO (Ministry of Defence of the SR).

The Sliač referendum is not the only example of the pro-Russian propaganda escaping the virtual environment and affecting social reality in Slovakia. At the beginning of 2023, there was a series of "Protests for Peace" across Slovakia.

Fig. 7. A Slovak "Protest for Peace" in Žilina (Madro 2023)

As can be seen in the photo, a protester is holding a banner with the slogan "We will be saved from slavery by the Z-change". The tricolour in the background is shared by both Slovakia and Russia, but the Z clearly refers to the symbol used by the Russian occupation forces in Ukraine. The man with the megaphone is Andrej Medvecký – a twice convicted (Osvaldová, 2022) representative of the Slovak neo-Nazi party People's Party Our Slovakia led by another convict, Marián Kotleba (Kováč, 2022). The protesters were calling for Slovakia to leave the EU, accused Ukrainians of murdering Russian-speaking inhabitants of Ukraine and the US of waging a war against Russia. They also spread another hoax about military mobilisation in Slovakia (Madro 2023). The "mobilisation hoax" perpetuated by one of the well-known disinformation servers, Bádateľ.sk, achieved such a momentum that Slovak men started submitting refusals to perform the military service (Hutko, 2023). To sum up, the organisers of these protests are a typical fifth column (Madro, 2023), i.e., "a clandestine group or faction of subversive agents who attempt to undermine a nation's solidarity by any means at their disposal" (Encyclopaedia Britannica).

Discussion and conclusions

The goal of this paper was to present the research of ideological discourse performed using the method of discourse analysis elaborated by van Dijk (2006). Firstly, I outlined the historical context for the first part of my material research, which was focused on ideology in literary paratexts. Subsequently, the basic concepts of ideology and ideological discourse were defined (Van Dijk, 2006; Verschueren, 2012; Stråth, 2013; Zmigrod, 2022).

In the methodological part, the concept of an ideological discourse marker was defined for the purpose of this study. The material research consisted of two parts. The first part focused on ideology in paratexts incorporated in the novels translated from English into Slovak, which were published in Czechoslovakia between 1968 and 1989. This research file comprised all existing and available samples of forewords and afterwords, which met the aforementioned criteria ($N = 100$). The presence of ideological markers

peaked in 1977, which correlates with Charter 77, an informal civic initiative against normalisation practices.

In the second part of my research, I applied the same method to perform a small case study consisting of 5 samples (Facebook posts), which were complemented by a (serious) newspaper article to illustrate how propaganda shapes the online content produced by Slovak commenters and by extension, physical reality.

As for the limitations, the second case study presents a very limited sample. Case study findings cannot be generalised although they may indicate a trend.

As the Globsec survey (Szekers, 2021) has shown, Slovakia is the most vulnerable EU country when it comes to falling for disinformation. The presented method of ideological discourse marker analysis could be helpful in terms of propaganda identification. The Internet requires a completely new skillset to sift through the vast amount of information that may or may not be credible.

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ЧЕХОСЛОВАЦЬКА НОРМАЛІЗАЦІЯ VS. СУЧАСНІ СОЦІАЛЬНІ МЕДІА: ВИЗНАЧЕННЯ МАРКЕРІВ ІДЕОЛОГІЧНОГО ДИСКУРСУ

В с т у п . *Представлено дослідження ідеологічного дискурсу, здійснене за допомогою методу дискурсивного аналізу. Спочатку окреслюється історичний контекст першої частини дослідження, присвяченої ідеології в літературних паратекстах.*

М е т о д и . *Згодом визначатимуться основні поняття, такі як ідеологія та ідеологічний дискурс. У методологічній частині визначено поняття маркера ідеологічного дискурсу для цілей цього дослідження. Матеріал дослідження складається з двох частин. Перша частина зосереджена на ідеології в паратекстах, включених до романів, перекладених з англійської словацькою, які були опубліковані в Чехословаччині між 1968 і 1989 рр. Матеріал дослідження склали всі наявні та доступні зразки передмов і післямов, які відповідали вищезазначеним критеріям (N=100). Пік присутності ідеологічних маркерів припадає на 1977 р., що корелює з "Хартією 77" – неформальною громадською ініціативою проти практик нормалізації.*

Р е з у л ь т а т и . *Згодом той самий метод було застосовано для проведення невеликого тематичного дослідження, що складалося з п'яти зразків (постів у Facebook), які було доповнено газетною статтею, щоб проілюструвати, як пропаганда формує онлайн-контент, створений словацькими коментаторами, а отже, і фізичну реальність. Як показало дослідження Globsec, Словаччина є найбільш вразливою країною ЄС, коли йдеться про піддавання дезінформації.*

В и с н о в к и . *Представлений метод аналізу маркерів ідеологічного дискурсу може бути корисним для ідентифікації пропаганди. Інтернет вимагає абсолютно нових навичок, щоб просіювати багато інформації, яка може бути достовірною, а може й не бути.*

К л ю ч о в і с л о в а : *історіографія перекладу; нормалізація; паратекст; соціальні медіа; ідеологія; пропаганда.*